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Creative Genius: The Aesthetic Basisf or a Kantian Symbolic Theology
No aspect of Kant'sC ritical philosophys uffers from more ambiguity thanh is multifaceted portrayal of human imagination. One need look no further than the Analytic of the first Critique (KrV)¹ to find evidence that imagination functions as aw ild card in the Kantian deck of cognitive powers:i tf unctions both empirically, as memory ("reproductive imagination"), and transcendentally, as the synthesis required for concept-formation ("productive imagination") -and in various other ways.T he theory of productive imagination expounded in KrV'ss econd edition replaces the first edition'sp ortrayal of concept-formation as at hreefold synthesis, whose details can be summarized as follows:
1. synthesis of apprehension in intuition (i. e. empirical diversity via manifold of intuition) 2. synthesis of reproductioninimagination (i. e. memory)
3. synthesis of recognition in conception (i. e. intellectual unity via apperceptionand the categories)
Fig. 1: Threefold synthesisinKrV's first edition
The special role of reproductive imagination, the middle term in this threefold logical process, is to synthesize the three syntheses, which together functiona s necessary,p re-conceptual conditions for anyp ossible experience. In this application imagination -and here Itake Kant to be referring to the entire threefold/ productive process -is "ablind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognitionw hatsoever,b ut of which we are conscious onlyv ery rarely."² As such, productive imagination is a pre-conscious activity:i tinforms understanding without involving "cognitioni nt he proper meaning of the term."
Step 1ofthe threefold synthesis entails the wholly unconscious apprehension of data from the senses, through intuition -the formal requirements for such apprehension being the theme of the Aesthetic. What is lacking in the reproductive imagination'ss ynthesiso ft he manifold of intuition, making step 2 still less thanf ullyc onscious,i st he unity contributed by step3 :w erecognize something onlyb yb ringingi tt ot he power of apperception,c onnectinga ll synthesized sense objectstoeach other by virtue of being experiences of asingle 'I'.³ The first aspect of human imagination that Kant deems necessary for cognition in KrV thus occurs at as tageo fc ognitive processing thati s( at least logically, though perhaps not chronologically) prior to one'sa wareness of self-identity as at hinking subject.
Athorough treatment of Kant'stheory of imagination would have to examine its role in schematism,whereitenables the categories (especiallythe three "moments" of quantity -unity,multiplicityand totality) to produce knowledge,and its explicit absencefrom the typic of practical reason, which requires moral reasoning to effect an on-imaginative synthesis. But the foregoing summary must suffice for the modest goal of this paper:t olay the basis for aK antian symbolic theologybyscrutinizing the role of aesthetic ideas in Kant'st heory of genius, in search of clues as to how imagination might functioni ntheological reasoning.
Of all the ways Kant employs the concept of imagination, none is more profound yetless understood thanhis discussion of genius,nearthe end of the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment in the third Critique (KU, § § 46 -50). He begins with acryptic definition that prefigures the complexity of his entire discussion: "Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that givesthe rule to art."⁴ As this talent is itself a product of nature, Kant clarifies thatg enius is a "mental predisposition […] through which nature givesthe rule to art." He then ties this creative impulse directlytoimagination -not surprisingly,since his definition of genius presents it as having the same primordial status as schematism in KrV:Both occur prior to our attainment of empirical knowledge.Creative genius brings ap rior synthesis to nature, manipulating it through acts of imagination in order to produce art,a In this definition "art" refers to products of fine art -i. e. to artworks based on an indeterminate rule. Overlypurposive and under-creative works,based on a determinate concept,K ant calls "mechanicala rt".⁵ Genius endows ap erson with an "originality" that "must be exemplary",yet the person "cannot describe or indicate scientificallyhow it bringsabout its products".⁶ That is, genius is an immediate experience of knowing how to createabeautifulwork of art,but cannot be expressed through discursive explanations.
Religious implications of Kant'st heory emerge when he portrays genius as the ability to be specially open to nature'st ranscendent,r ule-shapingp ower: he refers to it as a "guiding spirit that each person is givena sh is own at birth"⁷ -the genius being ap erson who can channel this spirit and depict it in physical forms through the manipulation of natural objects, but who nevertheless "does not know" and cannot "show how his ideas […]a rise" and thus "cannot teach it to anyone else." Kant assumes that,b ecause "the artist'ss kill cannot be communicated",i t" must be conferred directlyo ne ach person by the hand of nature."⁸ Indeed, although this skill "dies with [the artist]", genius does not die; rather,itmerelywaits "until some daynature again endows someone else in the same way".⁹ Kant carefullydistinguishes (e. g. in §48) art criticism (i. e. learned expertise in judging products of beauty via taste)f rom art work (i. e. the natural talent of Creative Genius creating products of beauty via genius). An art critic'saim is to judge the perfection of an artwork, where "perfection" is "the harmonyofathing'smanifold with an intrinsic determination of the thing,i.e., with its purpose".¹⁰ This "manifold" is the manifold of intuition that, as KrV argued, serves as the given for the synthetic work of productive imagination in bringingperceptions to the mind during the process of concept-formation. When Kant says "arta lwaysp resupposes a purpose"¹¹ -i. e. good works of art servea sa ne mpirical means to convey some end -he is suggesting that the unorganized manifold becomes aw ork of art onlyw hen genius drivesi magination to synthesize it in aw ay that brings it to unity,aunity contributed by concepts in the case of determinateknowledge. What is the unifying feature that makes aw ork of genuine art perfect?
Kant answers thiscrucialquestion in §49byintroducing twokey terms:what is missing when artwork fails to meetthe standardofgenuine beauty is spirit,for onlyt hrough spirit does genius gain access to aesthetici deas. By "spirit" here Kant means "the animating principle in the mind" that uses some "material" to give our "mental powers ap urposive momentum, i.e., [it] i mpartst ot hema play" that is self-perpetuating.¹² As Kant develops thisc laim, it emergest hat this "play" is the same play of imagination thatg ives riset ob eauty (when it plays withu nderstanding) or sublimity( when it plays withr eason).K ant uses twocloselyrelated termstoexplain the relationshipbetween the factors enabling agenius to produceaperfectwork of art: "presentation" (Vorstellung) and "exhibition" (Darstellung). Translated literally, theset erms denote twot ypes of "positioning" ("Stellung"): "pre-" ("Vor-")p ositioninga nd "re-" ("Dar-")p ositioning. As such, he claimst he specially-endowedp rinciple of artistic spirit is "nothing but the ability to exhibit [re-position] aestheticideas";¹³ suchanidea is "apresentation [pre-positioning] of the imagination which prompts much thought,b ut to which no determinatet hought[ … ]c an be adequate." Comparing aesthetic ideasw itht he moref amiliarr ational ideas( God,f reedom and immortality), which KrV portrays as the proper objects of metaphysics,h ep oints outt hat, whereas "a rational idea is ac oncept to which no intuition (nop resentation of the imagination)c an be adequate",¹⁴ an aesthetic idea is an intuition (a presentation of the imagination), to which no concept can be adequate. Just as the philosopherp resents (re-positions) concepts,h opingt og ain insighti ntot he na- Kant'sradical suggestion in §49isthatthe purpose of aestheticideas corresponds directlytothatofrational ideas. By imaginatively unifying diverse materials into awhole under an aesthetic idea, genius "creates […]another nature out of the material thatactual nature givesit."¹⁶ That this other nature refers at least to the idea of freedom, and perhaps also to the other two ideas of reason, becomes clear when Kant adds that the artist'sr estructuring of experience on the basis of "analogical laws" follows "principles which reside higher up, namely in reason (and which are just as natural to us as those which the understanding follows in apprehendinge mpirical nature)." The two "natures" here are the empirical naturek nown by means of imagination-enriched understanding and the moral nature known by means of imagination-impoverished reason. (From the moral standpoint,K ant argues in the second Critique,weh avea ccess only to af ormal "typic",n ot to ac oncrete "image".) Aesthetic ideas contributet o our appreciation of the ideas of reason, for they enable us to "feelo ur freedom from the lawo fa ssociation"-i. e. our freedom from "the empirical use of the imagination" as set out in KrV.H eret he paradox of art comes fullyi nto view: "for although it is under that [empirical] law[of productive imagination] that nature lends us material," art givesu st he power to "process that material into something quite different,n amely into something that surpasses nature."¹⁷ Kant concludes §49b ya rguing that such aesthetic ideas, as "presentations of the imagination" on the basisofananalogy with rational ideas, "strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience."¹⁸ By shapingnatural materials so they aim at this transcendent result, aesthetic ideas "try to approach an exhibition [re-positioning] of rational concepts (intellectual ideas)" that gives them "as emblance of objective reality." Such "sensible expression" of rational ideas "goes beyond the limits of experience" by expressing "ac ompleteness for which no example can be found in nature." Aesthetic ideas thus do for the creative work of genius what the unity of apperception does for ordinary empirical knowing:They bring the plurality conveyedb yt he manifold of intuition into  Kant'sintended referentisambiguous. Samuel Stoner persuasively argues in "On the Primacy of the Spectator in §49ofK ant's Critique of Judgment" (in the present Proceedings)that Kant is still talkingabout the perceiver of art rather than its creator in the openingparagraphs of §49. Id on ot see these options as mutuallye xclusive. unity by means of an imagined object,synthesizing these opposites by applying to them the categorial moment of totality,a ss hown in Figure 3. plurality of unorganized material (asfound in nature via intuition) totality of agenuine (creative) artwork unity provided by aesthetic ideas (asconveyed by genius through presentationsofimagination)
Fig.3:Thefunctionofaesthetic ideas
In this process "the imagination is creative",s etting "the power of intellectual ideas (i. e., reason) in motion: it makes reason think more"¹⁹ -more than when we seek empirical knowledge of the samen atural material through determinate concepts. This direct linking of aesthetic ideas to rational ideas suggests that Kant'stheologyrequires us to take into account the crucial role of symbolism in bringinglife, so to speak, to aGod that would be amere abstraction, if human understanding werel eft to its own,p urelys peculative devices.That is, Kantian theologym ust be grounded in aesthetic imagination.
What is easy to overlook when readingK rV is that Kant'si nterest in God does not begin with the Dialectic,b ut permeates the entire book. Fore xample, in the passagei mmediately before his (first edition) discussion of the steps in imagination'st hreefold synthesis, whose function is to explain how "pure concepts of the understanding" (i. e. the 12 categories) are possible, he observes that once the mind has generated the categories by performing this synthesis, it finds other pure concepts of understandinga lso arising -some of which mayb e" impossible",w hile others "are in themselvesp ossible but cannot be giveni na ny experience."²⁰ The objects corresponding to the latter "mayb ei ncapable of being giveni ne xperience" either because we have omitted part of the pre-conceptual threefold synthesis (makingt he object impossible to experience) or because the concepts in question "are extended beyond what experi- Kant: KU,A A0 5: 314.  Kant: KrV,A96. ence can encompass (as in the concept of God)." The process of such extension "must always contain the pure apriori conditions of apossible experience and of an object of possibleexperience.For otherwise not onlywould nothing whatever be thought through these elements, but they themselvesw ould be without data and hence could not arise even in thought."²¹ While Kant clarifiesthatthe latter statement refers primarily to the categories (the "elements" of all apriori cognition), he applies it also to other ap riori concepts thatt he mind generatesi ni ts extension of thinking beyond the boundary of experience.H is point is that our concept of God cannot refer to areal object unless we apply it in imagination to synthesize the manifold of something presented to our 'I'.
Turning to KrV'sDialectic we find that the operative apriori concept guiding Kant'se ntire discussion of the ideas of reason is "totality".When introducing God, freedom and immorality,aspure concepts of reason that transcend the possibility of experience,K ant writest hat an idea "always concerns onlyt he absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions,a nd never ends except at what is unconditioned absolutely [ … ] . Forp ure reason leavese verything else to understanding,[the power] which initiallyrefers to objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination."²² This passaget ells us thata ll empirical knowledge generated by our application of the understandingt oc oncepts that are exhibited in experience is subjecttothe synthesis thatisthe essentialfeature of imagination (see Fig.1 ); but this same "synthesis of conditions" is precisely what generatesideas of reason when extended, as if it could reach the unconditioned. Kant adds that,inthe sameway categories are "the unity of understanding" as applied to appearance, ideas are "the unity of reason" so applied. Moreover,the onlyp roper use of these ideas, once we form them, is "to prescribe to understanding the direction leading to acertain unity -aunity of which the understandingh as no concept and which aims at collatinga ll acts of understanding,i nr egard to every object,i na nabsolute whole."²³ This "collating" function refers to imagination's proper (non-speculative)r ole in reason'sa pplication. However,the resultofthis synthesis is not to set reason loose in the transcendent realm to generate whatever suits its fancy;this is the sourceofthe illusory pseudo-science of metaphysics that Kant debunks in KrV.Rather,Kant'spoint here is that,byrequiringthe ideas to be synthesized in our imagination with "acts of understanding",w eg round them in the very experience that they by definition transcend -the samei neffable experience harnessed by creative genius. That is, the proper function of the ideas of reason is to provide hypothetical unity to what we might call the manifold of conception -i. e. to the diverse directions in which the unbridled understanding leadsthe mind when it is set freefrom intuition -and this regulative use of ideas occurs most fruitfullyw hen we tie them back to concrete symbol(s) of the sort arising in religious or theological traditions. The purpose of KrV'sD ialectic, as Figure 4i llustrates, is neither to destroy theologynor to reduceittoapretended moral belief in what we know to be nothing but an idea created by the mind; rather,itdemonstrates that imagination must be reintroduced to theology to provide it with appropriate groundinga nd thus eclipset he sophistical speculation that oftenm isleads philosophers.
Giventhis wayofgroundingKantian theology, we should not be surprised to find Kant portraying imagination as the power first enablingust oform the concept of God, as when he statesinReligion that,inour "theoretical presentation of God and his essence", "anthropomorphism […]isscarcelyavoidable" and usually "innocent enough".²⁴ It is unavoidable because anthropomorphism allows imagination to flourish by supplying the intuition that is missing from pure rational theology. This is dangerous,hecautions, onlywhen we anthropomorphize our moral relation to God, because whenthat occurs we improperly "make aGod for ourselves",deludingourselvesthat we can win God'sfavor just as we win approval from other human beings -as if God were not primarilyc oncernedw ith our moral integrity.
Kant'ssolution to the antinomyofreason arising in respect to KrV'scosmological idea suggests as imilar approach:
 Kant: KGV, AA 06:168, my translation.
